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Elites and Revolution: Political Relegation  
and Reintegration of Former Senior  
Government Officials in Tunisia 
Jérôme Heurtaux ∗ 
Abstract: »Eliten und Revolution: Politische Relegation und Reintegration von 
ehemaligen hohen Regierungsbeamten in Tunesien«. What happens to the state 
elite of an authoritarian regime after its collapse? This article proposes an an-
swer by examining the Tunisian case after the fall of Ben Ali’s regime in 2011. 
Based on a corpus of in-depth interviews with sixty or so ex-politicians or civil 
servants, the article starts by describing the collapse of the regime in terms of 
the experience and perceptions of some of those who had served it. This is not 
presented as a series of institutional and political events linked up in a homog-
enous and unidirectional process, but rather as a variety of individual experi-
ences, each unique. The fall of the regime thereby emerges as a concrete expe-
rience of political relegation, documented in precise detail by the accounts 
given of it. Analyzing this experience provides a way of testing several hypoth-
eses regarding the post-revolutionary careers of former senior officials, stress-
ing just how complex and diverse the paths are for reintegrating the political 
class. 
Keywords: Revolution, political elite, democratic transition, political parties, 
Arab Spring, Tunisia. 
1.  Introduction 
Scholarship on large-scale political change in the wake of major historical 
events – such as revolution, colonial invasion, or post-war situations – tends to 
overlook the vanquished. The dominant classes, government officials, and 
politicians of the former regime, disqualified by “history”, often receive far less 
attention than revolutionaries, former opposition figures, and leaders of the new 
regime together with the social groups on whose support they draw. Still, for-
mer regime “elites” attract a degree of scholarly interest when dissension be-
tween the former state and the ruling classes is viewed as a main cause of revo-
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lution, or when former government officials prompt a “counterrevolution”, or 
win reappointment in the new regime. An extensive body of scholarship exam-
ines the circulation, renewal and/or reproduction of elites in the context of 
regime change (Gil, Szelenyi and Townsley 1998; Higley, Pakulski and Weso-
lowski 1998). 
The increase in scholarly interest in this topic with regard to Tunisia may be 
traced to the emergence of the Nidaa Tounes party in 2012, and especially its 
victory in the parliamentary elections on October 26, 2014, and of its leader, 
Beji Caid Essebsi, in the presidential elections on December 21, 2014.  
The victory of Nidaa Tounes and arrival in power of President Beji Caid Es-
sebsi may have led certain sections of Tunisian society to feel that the former 
regime was staging a comeback. At times, observers of Tunisian politics 
latched onto the impromptu comments to this effect flooding social media, 
emanating from certain political sectors and spokespersons for revolutionary 
groups speaking with varying degrees of authority. Such comments, based on 
approximate observation, decried the continuation or renewal of certain prac-
tices from the past, such as corruption or collusion between businessmen and 
politicians, said to be widespread since 2011. Others denounced the persistence 
of numerous assaults on fundamental rights (human rights and freedom of 
expression), railing against the arbitrary deployment of police and judicial 
power and the use of torture, seen as symbolizing a suggestively mysterious 
“deep state”. It was claimed that the prevalence and aggravation of factors 
leading to the revolution, such as social and regional inequalities, were clear 
proof there had been no real regime change. But the most frequent point was 
that “men from the former regime”, taking advantage of the failure to conduct a 
purge and the weak transitional and criminal justice mechanisms introduced 
post-2011, were back in government. Nidaa Tounes, a political party partly 
founded in 2012 by a group of politicians from the former regime, was identi-
fied as the main conduit by which former senior officials returned to power. 
Unlike the major social revolutions of the two previous centuries, the break 
with the former regime did not involve any massive, violent, and bloody purge 
of government leaders (Skocpol 1979). Equally, unlike the “pacted transitions” 
after communism collapsed in Eastern Europe, there was no question of “draw-
ing a thick line” under the past (to use the expression of the first post-
communist Polish prime minister, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, in a speech to the 
Polish parliament on August 24, 1989). Several former senior officials were put 
on trial, and in 2013 a transitional justice process was set up. These internal 
establishment dealings shed light on how the “men of the past” returned. This 
article seeks to sketch out a reply to two major issues in studies of post-regime 
changes to the composition of elites. First, how do the political personnel of a 
fallen regime handle its collapse? What practical experiences and representa-
tions accompany this subjective and objective relegation? Second, how do 
certain former government officials, adapting to the new political context, get 
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to be reappointed, thereby continuing or resuming their political careers? Is this 
rebound by former senior officials a factor converting them to democracy? 
This article is based on a corpus of in-depth interviews with sixty or so poli-
ticians and civil servants from the Ben Ali regime, conducted between summer 
2011 and summer 2017.  
The sample comprises several senior politicians and civil servants of differ-
ing status and career paths (prime ministers, ministers, MPs, chairmen of insti-
tutions or state-owned companies, high-ranking RCD officials, regional RCD 
leaders, ambassadors, etc.). It was initially based on the acquaintanceship net-
works of certain Tunisian academics who were well-connected to elite social 
circles, and the pool of interviewees progressively expanded over time. The 
interviews were carried out face-to-face, normally at the interviewee’s home. 
They were often recorded, sometimes in exchange for guaranteeing anonymity. 
The identity of the interviewer (a foreign researcher who was neither Tunisian 
nor a journalist) probably helped establish trust, especially during the first two 
years of study, when the unfavorable political context did little to encourage 
former elites to speak openly.  
The article starts by describing the collapse of the regime in terms of the ex-
perience and perceptions of some of those who had served it. This is not pre-
sented as a series of institutional and political events linked up in a homoge-
nous and unidirectional process, but rather as a variety of individual 
experiences, each unique. The fall of the regime thereby emerges as a concrete 
experience, documented in precise detail by the accounts given of it. Analyzing 
this experience provides a way of testing several hypotheses regarding the post-
revolutionary careers of former senior officials, stressing just how complex and 
diverse the paths are for reintegrating the political class. 
2. The Extent, Perceptions, and Multiple Faces of Political 
Relegation 
Though the “Tunisian revolution” did not result in lustration, the collapse of 
the Ben Ali regime led to several hundred individuals being suddenly expelled 
from positions of authority, even though in many cases these positions were 
largely a matter of form given the concentration of power in the hands of a 
small circle. Key players were evicted from the system of power over the 
course of the timeframe studied here, from January 14, 2011 (the date when 
Ben Ali fled) to October 23, 2011 when elections to the Tunisian National 
Constituent Assembly were held. The presidential palace was placed under new 
command, while Ben Ali’s in-laws were excluded from the heart of power and 
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their goods confiscated by the state1. The constitution was suspended, and the 
upper and lower houses (the chamber of deputies and chamber of advisers) 
were dissolved, along with the constitutional court, the social and economic 
council, and other state institutions whose members were appointed on the 
basis of their ties to power. The president’s party, the Democratic Constitution-
al Rally (Rassemblement Constitutionnel Démocratique, or RCD), was dis-
banded by court ruling, consigning its former leaders to political anonymity. 
Several ministers who had served under Ben Ali were awarded government 
posts, and some governors from the former regime were reappointed, but both 
groups were subsequently dismissed, as were many delegates (officials at the 
level below that of governor). Ambassadors appointed before January 14 were 
also recalled. Within a few months, most government officials were forced to 
relinquish power. All RCD officials were even debarred from standing in the 
October 23, 2011 elections.2 
The apex of power was thus decapitated. But things were different at lower 
levels of power, where the situation was more complex, varying from one 
administration or sector to another. In general, high-ranking civil servants 
either retained their posts, or else were affected to equivalent or lower positions 
while maintaining the benefits associated with their prior status.3 The ministry 
of communication was quite simply dissolved, but while certain civil servants 
at the ministry of the interior were dismissed, there were no general shake-up 
despite Ben Ali having used it as a prime means of political domination (Inter-
national Crisis Group 2012). At the ministry of justice, some judges were re-
moved, though not until 2012, but many found the decision unfair for most 
judges from the former regime retained their positions. New university chan-
cellors and deans were elected over the course of the year. As for economic 
circles, a fair number of businessmen moved in the same social circles as 
members of the judiciary, and though many had their passports confiscated, no 
steps were taken against them as a whole. Most chairmen of state-owned com-
panies held onto their posts, though there were a few cases of dismissal in the 
wake of staff protests. Further work needs to be done to provide a more de-
tailed assessment of the situation sketched out in the preceding lines. The per-
spective also needs to be widened to examine the social groups forming the 
                                                             
1  By decree-law no. 2011-13 of March 14, 2011, signed by the interim president, Fouad 
Mebazaa, "confiscating assets, movable goods, and real estate”, acquired by Zine el-Abidine 
Ben Ali, his wife, and 112 acquaintances. 
2  By the decree-law no 2011-35 of May 10, 2011 on the election of the National Constituent 
Assembly. Article 15 stipulates that “whoever took office in the outgoing government of the 
former president except for those who were not part of the Democratic Constitutional Rally 
and all those who were entrusted with a position within the Democratic Constitutional Rally 
in the former president's government” were declared ineligible to stand for election, as were 
those who before January 14 had implored Ben Ali to run for the presidency in 2014. 
3  Interviews with several high-ranking civil servants (2011-2015). 
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ruling class’s loyalist clientele base, reciprocally linked by family ties, business 
relationships, social bonds, and geographical proximity. 
2.1  Political Relegation  
The idea of “political relegation” is useful for characterizing the fate of former 
senior officials from the regime. It is more appropriate than the more wide-
spread one of “political demise”, which tends to be applied to an individual 
rather than a group, and which stresses the irreversible nature of their down-
wards trajectory. “Political relegation” may affect individuals or groups, with-
out specifying the exact nature of the change. Like social decline, it is relative, 
and reversible. It may take many different forms depending upon: sociographic 
parameters (gender, age, education, professional experience), political factors 
(proximity to Ben Ali or his wife’s family, having been minister of a regalian 
department, acted as a presidential adviser, or held a subaltern post), the con-
text (the upwards or downwards path of the individual’s career at the time of 
the revolution), and so on. For many, political defeat is experienced as a “sud-
den turning point” in their lives, transpiring in different ways depending upon 
several individual and contextual parameters. It may take the form of forced 
resignation of directors of an institution after protests by its personnel (a phe-
nomenon referred to in French as dégagisme), dismissal, forced retirement, or 
else the dissolution of the institution itself by political or joint political and 
judicial decision (Voetgli 2004). 
In a way, the consequences of January 14 held up a magnifying mirror to the 
elites. It revealed the scale of their political resources, and brought their rela-
tionship with the head of state into focus. Equally, the way they apprehended 
time underwent a transformation. One of the paths to a successful political 
career in Tunisia used to involve long periods of being sidelined or inactive, 
alternating with phases of accelerating up through the ranks in a series of ab-
rupt and unexpected promotions. Thus whilst those in the ascending phase in 
2011 saw their career paths interrupted, those waiting on the sidelines saw all 
hope of promotion evaporate, for Ben Ali’s fall automatically triggered the 
collapse of all prospect of promotion. 
These experiences of political relegation were not necessarily accompanied 
by social decline, or at least not to the same extent. This depended on the pro-
portion of political as opposed to non-political resources that individuals could 
draw on to maintain their social position. It also depended on their capacity to 
use these resources in new social and political conditions, and on whether or 
not society sought to impose sanctions for having held a political post in the 
past. In Tunisia there was not the same form of brutal social decline as that 
encountered, for example, by the “White Russians” who were forced into exile 
in the wake of the Bolshevik victory in 1917 (Jevakhoff 2007). Apart from a 
few figures from the Ben Ali regime who stood trial and served prison sentenc-
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es, and whose assets were confiscated, most were able to retain an equivalent 
social position, albeit diminished now they were shorn of the symbolic benefits 
flowing from their former responsibilities. 
Nevertheless, a fair share of the political class from the previous regime was 
suddenly deprived of any space for political activity or expression. Several 
hundred senior officials found they were no longer in the spotlight, a situation 
which could last varying lengths of time, in certain cases be irreversible, and at 
times virtually equate to political demise. When Ben Ali fell, so too did a group 
hitherto in charge of political representation and thus matters of population 
oversight (elected representatives, national and regional RCD officials, presi-
dential advisers, ministers, governors, ambassadors, etc.).  
2.2  Subjective Experiences of Relegation 
Relegation is also a matter of perception. Maurice Halbwachs notes that it 
involves “going from a group you know and where you are held in esteem, to 
another where you are not known and have no particular reason to care for its 
appreciation” (Halbwachs 2002). Relegation thus involves aspects that the 
observer cannot directly detect, such as loss of visibility, and fewer solicita-
tions, phone calls, and requests to intercede. These affect figures used to being 
continually approached by numerous petitioners, and whose prestige was based 
on the symbolic commerce they had with titular officials and other people of 
influence. Political relegation is a social experience that may lead to a feeling 
of social decline. Public opinion of former leaders, as expressed in public de-
bate, press articles, television programs, and conversations in social spaces 
(neighborhoods, cafés, etc.), may also lead some to feel they have been mar-
ginalized, despite objectively retaining the same position. 
In speaking of these episodes in their individual lives, interviewees present-
ed them as inextricably bound up with collective experience, given the strong 
links between the two. Ben Ali’s “fleeing” Tunisia on January 14, 2011 was 
viewed retrospectively as the major event of the period, triggering the collapse 
of the regime and the loss of their political positions. Admittedly, this event 
was subsequently constructed as the end-goal of the Tunisian revolution and 
the beginning of the post-revolution period.4 But that does not suffice to ex-
plain why members of the former regime referred to it as a traumatic event, 
some circumspectly and others in more violent terms. The fact they remem-
bered it as a “focal point” in a shifting situation is especially striking, for it had 
more or less immediate effects on the political and symbolic position they held 
at the time, irrespective of how close their relationship was to the summit of 
power. In the former regime, the head of state had been the keystone in the 
institutional political edifice, naming, appointing, promoting, and removing 
                                                             
4  Even though this interpretation is not shared by all (Heurtaux 2014). 
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people from positions of power. It was the head of state who distributed sym-
bolic capital. Careers were made, and undone, through the exchange of favors 
and a personalized form of political patronage. 
Although his departure did not immediately spell institutional collapse, it 
did automatically devalue all those who owed their position to Ben Ali person-
ally. The first to be affected were those who held positions in institutions over-
seeing “political representation activities”, starting with the ruling RCD party 
(Camau and Geisser 2003). The symbolic resources of its secretary-general 
were abruptly devalued, and his position in the political field altered. He went 
overnight from being a strongman to a pariah. He had stayed at party headquar-
ters on Avenue Mohamed V, just round the corner from the ministry of the 
interior where the January 14 demonstration took place, and at 5 PM, when 
Ben Ali left Tunisia, went home, where he realized his world was collapsing:  
I dropped everything, I can tell you. I tried to protect myself physically and 
personally. It was over for me. I was expecting the worst. I was disgusted. 
By the departure of Ben Ali? 
By the way it ended, and the worry.5 
Not all officials underwent immediate political relegation. Certain ministers 
and members of the RCD central committee managed to hold onto power in the 
following weeks. But for those whose career was abruptly interrupted, Ben 
Ali’s departure came as a blow that they described as traumatic: 
Well I was shocked. I wasn’t expecting it at all, and today I still can’t explain 
why he left. A normal person holding that responsibility can’t leave, it isn’t 
possible, they cannot leave. If I had been president, I would’ve stayed till the 
bitter end, I would never have left. I might have got my family to leave, but I 
would never have left. So I experienced it as a terrible shock, also as a betray-
al, because if he had stayed, all that wouldn’t have happened. If he had stayed, 
he would’ve got his family to leave and we would’ve got the country working, 
um, um, on the bases, on where the country actually stood, and not by wiping 
things out and say everything was black. I was shocked. I was ill for several 
months, I mean mentally ill, I reckoned I didn’t deserve that.6 
Ben Ali’s departure, which subsequently led to a controversy about whether he 
had left the country of his own accord (had fled) or been forced to do so, was 
long viewed in the terms that emerged in the minutes after the presidential 
plane took off. Many described what was, for them, the tragic outcome of the 
uprising in terms of abandonment and betrayal:  
A feeling of cowardice, yes cowardice, a captain doesn’t leave, especially not 
a military man.7 […] I tried to find, how can I put it, elements to try to under-
                                                             
5  Mohamed Gueriani, RCD secretary-general interview, interview, Tunis, 2013. 
6  A minister in office during the revolution, interview, Tunis, 2011. 
7  Ben Ali received military training, and holds a diploma from the French military academy of 
Saint-Cyr. 
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stand, positive elements. Was it true that he wished to accompany his family 
and then return? And even that, even trying in all good faith, I thought: he’s 
not entitled to do that, he’s not entitled to think of his son and his family.8 
Admittedly, such an interpretation is very convenient in that it clears loyal 
elites of all responsibility, imputed entirely to the head of state. But it was not 
purely a rhetorical strategy. The memory of a particularly tricky moment runs 
through the unflattering account about the man who had hitherto embodied 
supreme power. 
It would be wrong to underestimate the psychological effect this departure 
had on all those for whom the departure of the “king’s” body physical neces-
sarily entailed the collapse of his body politic – though it would be out of place 
to analyze it in a work of sociology such as this. Still, the shock they experi-
enced equated to a loss of political position, and the devaluation of their entire 
career up to that point. It fed an additional frustration for those whose career 
had not yet peaked, such as a former senior party official who was convinced 
that he was being “prepared” by Ben Ali to one day be his interior minister, and 
for a former minister whose career had once again taken a rapid upwards turn. 
3. The Many Forms of Reintegration 
Viewed over a larger timescale, the relegation presented here as historical fact 
might emerge as a mere event, without any major medium-term impact on the 
principles governing the recruitment of government officials, and thus compa-
rable to the way great Ottoman families continued to form the elites in kemalist 
Turkey (Bouquet 2011). If we choose to look at the level of lineage, patronym-
ic, or social milieu, then relegation may go undetected. But it comes across 
more clearly at the scale of individuals, irrespective of whether or not it is only 
a passing phenomenon.  
Any assessment of the reintegration of political life by former senior offi-
cials can only be partial at best, given the lack of hindsight needed for a long-
term appraisal. Attention also needs to be paid to the diverse nature of post-
revolutionary careers, which have not all followed the same direction. Lastly, it 
is important to avoid a sequential approach, for relegation and re-promotion are 
not consecutive phenomena, but unfold over partially overlapping timeframes. 
Whilst this article distinguishes between the two, for reasons of clarity, they in 
fact need to be thought of together. Lastly, reintegration – or, to coin a meta-
phor, recycling – should not be thought of solely as an individual or collective 
strategy arising from the intentions of those concerned. For recycling to occur, 
there have to be people to be recycled, who are recyclable. Very often there 
                                                             
8  A minister in office during the revolution, interview, Tunis, 2011. 
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also have to be recyclers, and the political and judicial context has to encourage 
recycling, or at least not impede it. How does an individual become recyclable? 
Who are the recyclers? The only way to answer these questions is to adopt 
multiple scales, shifting from the individual to the group and from the group 
back to the individual. 
The argument may be set out succinctly. There is no doubt that a certain 
number of political and administrative officials from the fallen regime reinte-
grated political life. But whilst this is clearly visible in qualitative terms, it 
would appear at the time of writing (2017) to be marginal in quantitative terms, 
for those former officials who did not retire tended to move into other sectors, 
such as business, sometimes combined with cultural patronage and consultancy 
work, for instance.9 The “mauves” (a colloquial term designating the official 
color of the Ben Ali regime) did not monopolize post-revolutionary politics, 
and most of them were hit by an adjustment in the way multi-party contest 
worked. In the 2014 elections, ministers who had served under Ben Ali stood 
(unsuccessfully) for election by a now divided electorate (Heurtaux 2015). In 
other words, what some described as a “return”, suggesting a massive, unified, 
and one-directional process, in fact transpired as a series of scattered phenome-
na of individual and collective remobilizations that were frequently concurrent 
and overlapping.10 
First, it is worth pointing out that though Ben Ali’s fall from power was 
spectacular, and the subsequent political relegation widespread, this did not 
preclude the political survival of a small number of the regime’s servants who 
– as of January 14 and up until October 23 of the same year, when they were 
swept aside by elections to the National Constituent Assembly – resumed the 
reins at the main institutions of state. The provisional executive that stepped 
into the confusion after Ben Ali fled was headed by two notorious figures from 
his regime, namely Fouad Mebazaa and Mohamed Ghannouchi. The former, 
who was president of the chamber of deputies after a long career as an MP and 
minister, stretching back to the days of independence, was named interim pres-
ident of the Republic by virtue of article 57 of the 1959 constitution. The latter, 
who had been prime minister since 1999, continued in this position and was 
tasked with forming a new government.  
However, this phenomenon should not be seen as the first step in a vast re-
turn. In a way, these survivors from the former regime acted as a shield against 
the immediate reinstatement of larger numbers. They were pressured into leav-
                                                             
9  These distinct trajectories show that the actors did not all perceive political time in the 
same way. Certain embraced historical discontinuity, leaving politics and changing their 
lives, whilst others opted for individual continuity and accepted to partially realign their 
political activity. 
10  As in an opinion piece published by a group of academics and association actors published 
in Libération on November 21, 2014 under the title “En Tunisie, le retour de l’ancien régime 
n’est pas une rumeur”. 
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ing the RCD (whose central committee they belonged to), and on January 27 
they restructured the government, expelling ministers who were RCD members 
and orchestrating the disbanding of the party. A few weeks later they recog-
nized the need to speed up steps to dismember the regime’s institutions. Certain 
figures from the Ben Ali regime were also put on trial, with the agreement of 
the new authorities, at times at their behest even. These gestures – carried out 
in a very uncertain context and under pressure from several actors (the Tunisian 
General Labor Union (UGTT), the bar association, protesters from the Casbah 
1 and Casbah 2 movements, and the Committee to Protect the Revolution) – 
should not be analyzed as evidence of voluntary conversion perceiving the 
situation as a democratic transition. Instead they stemmed from a pragmatic 
reading by political actors with limited resources undergoing a process outside 
their control. Hence their contributions did not last. Mohamed Ghannouchi left 
politics after resigning on February 27, in the wake of pressure from the Cas-
bah 2 movement, while Fouad Mebazaa stood down after the National Constit-
uent Assembly elected Moncef Marzouki president of Tunisia on December 13. 
And it was a former minister of Bourguiba, Beji Caid Essebsi, who took over 
the political reins after Mohamed Ghannouchi. He worked with the High Au-
thority for the Achievement of the Objectives of the Revolution, Political Re-
form, and Democratic Transition (HIROR), invoking Bourguiba and Destour, 
and taking care not to recruit figures from Ben Ali’s period of the former re-
gime. 
Many former government officials denounced in the press (and in my inter-
views) an attitude they equated to abandonment, betrayal, or denial. They con-
tested certain decisions taken during the first six months of 2011 (the choice of 
a constituent assembly, the decision not to bring forward presidential elections, 
etc.), accusing the defectors of being turncoats who paved the way to the Islam-
ists seizing power. The controversy surrounding article 15 of the draft electoral 
law, which was finally passed by HIROR, debarring a certain number of former 
government officials from standing, compounded disagreement amongst for-
mer regime elites.11  
3.1  Building Up the Destourian Political Field 
The resultant fracture turned out to be a structural feature in the recomposition 
of the Destourian political field, that part of the political spectrum which is 
continually evoking its origins in the national movement and/or former regime. 
This is the light in which to assess the small political parties that sprang up in 
this sector as of 2011 (Khémira 2012). Most of these little parties were an-
chored around figures endowed with sufficient resources (notoriety and an 
ability to attract private funding) who had been part of the former regime. 
                                                             
11  Cf. footnote 2. 
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Some, such as the Initiative Party (Al Moubadara), led by the former minister 
of foreign affairs Kamel Morjane, distanced themselves from the Ben Ali re-
gime, whose legacy struck them as too inflammatory. Others competed to 
capture the support of those disappointed by the transition and nostalgic for the 
regime. Despite the ban on ex-RCD officials running in the 2011 elections, 
nine parties did stand, though only the Initiative Party was successful, winning 
five seats. These refuge parties (such as The Nation (Al Watan) led by the 
former minister Mohamed Jegham) made barely any impact, and most of the 
many attempts to work together met with failure. There were even more such 
attempts over the course of 2011, 2012, and 2013, but no party managed to 
gain sufficient visibility to warrant dreaming of political victory. However, one 
of these political enterprises, Nidaa Tounes, managed to coalesce around its 
leader, Beji Caid Essebsi, and to assert itself. It attracted defectors from the 
left, the trade union movement, the former regime, and the business world. In 
less than two years it established itself as the main opposition to the Islamist 
Ennahdha Party. In 2014, it along with other parties took advantage of the 
lifting of the ban on former RCD officials standing for political office, going on 
to win the general and presidential elections, garnering the support of most of 
the electoral clientele targeted by Destourian parties. 
3.2  Individual Instances of Recycling 
Nidaa Tounes and other parties that may be described as post-RCD – but which 
tend to present themselves as part of the national Destourian movement – 
emerged as conduits for recycling former government officials with fewer 
resources. Several middle-ranking officials from the former RCD stood as 
candidates on the lists of small post-RCD parties in the 2014 general elections, 
such as the former deputy secretary-general in charge of women’s affairs, Abir 
Moussa, and the former mayor of Tunis, Abbes Mohsen, for instance (Heurtaux 
2015).  
But the sphere of political recycling was far from being limited to Destouri-
an parties. Whenever the context was favorable, the leaders of other parties 
were also keen recyclers, seeking to “net” officials from the former regime to 
draw on their experience and networks of influence. During the interviews I 
conducted between 2011 and 2017, there was not a single former minister who 
did not boast of having been approached by the leader of a political party, to 
lend his “advice” to one, and his “support” to another, and above all to share 
their list of contacts. Before 2014 this “pragmatic rule” of party mobilization 
was rarely openly practiced (Bailey 1969). The perspective of the upcoming 
municipal elections in 2018, necessitating small-scale political work in the 
local constituencies, has revalorized the supposed qualities of former RCD 
officials more than ever. Certain parties, such as the liberal Afek Tounes Party 
for example, have made it part of their political strategy. 
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In the absence of recyclers there is no recycling. But not all candidates for 
recycling are necessarily recyclable. In Afek Tounes, for example, “corrupt” 
figures are not officially accepted, whether or not they have been put on trial 
(reputation and public rumor suffice).12 Thus certain parties practice a form of 
vetting, albeit not particularly formalized, in which they check the past of those 
seeking to be selected as candidate for a given election. 
Nevertheless, joining a party rapidly emerged as a necessary (though not 
sufficient) condition for political success. Former ministers under Ben Ali who 
ran in the 2014 presidential elections (Kamel Morjane, Mondher Zenaidi, Ab-
derrahim Zouari, and Mustapha Kamel Nabli) were crushed in the first round, 
with some even pulling their names from the ballot sheet. Despite extensive 
media coverage of their individual strategies, they failed to win popular sup-
port, even though one of them, Kamel Morjane, was also the leader of his par-
ty, and another, Abderrahim Zouari, enjoyed the backing of a Destourian party 
led by one of Ben Ali’s former prime ministers, Hamed Karoui. 
3.3 Defending the Material and Moral Interests of Former 
Government Officials 
When former officials seek to return to political life, whether on an individual 
initiative or part of a collective one by a group of varying degrees of organiza-
tion, they need to justify their return in speeches devised to legitimize their 
participation in public debate and electoral contest. Looking at the speeches by 
former ministers who ran for the presidency reveals a set of arguments recur-
ring as a leitmotiv: ambiguous references to the Ben Ali past, rhetorical ac-
ceptance of the principles of democracy coupled with bitter criticism of the 
“transition”, and, above all, the incessant vaunting of their presumed fitness to 
lead the state. In the words of Abderrahim Zouari: 
Tunisians today need to restore the authority of the state, [they need] a man 
who believes in democracy, who has experience of government business and 
the real world, [who knows] the regions, and can be operational immediately, 
for the situation in Tunisia is such that solutions cannot be delayed, which is 
why experience is paramount. I would like to remind you that I started my po-
litical path as Mayor of Dahmani, at the age of twenty-five, and that by thirty I 
was governor, the youngest mayor and governor ever! (Réalités, October 2-8, 
2014) 
Drawing on precise biographical details in this way might appear surprising, 
were it not backed up by a portrait of the former regime that minimizes any 
form of ideological adhesion to the fallen regime, and retrospectively distin-
guishes between their political career, downplayed to vaunt their service to the 
state. It is thus opportune to highlight one’s former service in the executive 
                                                             
12  A senior Afek Tounes official, interview, Tunis, June 2017. 
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apparatus of state, provided one erase the fact that these positions in the former 
regime required unwavering loyalty to the president, and that one emphasizes 
strictly sector-specific achievements. 
This explains the impressive list of successes Mondher Zenaidi boasted of in 
“serving the homeland” as minister on several occasions between 1994 and 
2011. Far from downplaying his personal experience, he emphasized his “long 
experience of state, enabling [him] and the experts [he has] called on to assess 
our social and economic history, to draw the lessons of undoubted successes 
and certain failures, and to formulate proposals for the future rooted in the 
values of the reformist current” (ibid). The stigma of his long ministerial expe-
rience (at the ministries of transport, tourism, trade, and public health between 
1994 and 2011) is turned on its head and presented as a strength in his strategy 
to capitalize on his political experience: 
When I was minister for public health, we had an excellent level of operation-
al efficiency while carrying out major structural reforms in the sector. If a ma-
chine broke down in any hospital we repaired it within a few days. […] We 
managed the H1N1 swine flu crisis in exemplary manner, so much so that the 
World Health Organization congratulated Tunisia on its efforts and the way 
this flu was contained without wasting any public money (<www.business 
news.com>, October 3, 2014). 
It is easy to understand the references to “competence”, for it is part of a wide-
spread social imaginary in Tunisia of state building by the elites. State officials 
– symbols of “modernity”, bearers of a vision for their country’s development, 
and champions of its sovereignty – even view themselves as indispensable to 
its economic success and proper public management, independently, for that 
matter, of the nature of the political regime and the reality of its economic 
“successes”. It is in such terms, and always in the name of “noble” causes – 
such as tackling Islamism, economic emergencies, re-establishing the state’s 
authority, or the need for national reconciliation – that attorneys, judges, publi-
cists, talk-show hosts, the heads of think tanks, media proprietors, and newspa-
per editors tend to champion or offer a platform to former government officials, 
thereby helping them return to public life.  
The credit attached to ministerial experience in the former regime needs to 
be linked to the ambiguous stance many former government officials have 
towards it. Very few of them condemn the former regime outright, and not all 
condemn its excesses, or even the exactions carried out prior to 2011. Their 
return to politics should thus not be thought of as signaling their practical and 
symbolic conversion to democracy, unlike their counterparts in the parties of 
Eastern Europe after 1989.  
Ben Ali’s former ministers have no doubt contributed indirectly to public 
recognition of the right of former government officials to stand for election, 
and to the implicit revalorization of the former regime, through their public 
pronouncements and by having stood for the most prestigious elections in the 
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country. The narrative they provide has played a part in defending the moral 
and material interests of government officials from the former regime. They are 
not alone in this, and ever more initiatives have taken place as part of the 
broader process of setting up a transitional justice system. This has triggered 
the reactivation of networks of former officials, in the form of clubs (of former 
MPs, governors, or delegates), think tanks, and through pronouncements in 
conferences and publications. They have sought to influence the content of the 
law on transitional justice, and regularly spoken out against how it is being 
implemented. More recently, they have supported the proposed law on eco-
nomic reconciliation put forward by President Beji Caid Essebsi, seeking to 
extend favorable treatment to high-ranking civil servants and businessmen 
implicated in corruption affairs under the former regime.13 Although the actions 
of these groups have not entirely healed the fractures in the former elite, they 
have resulted in the re-mobilization of a group that had been sorely tested by 
the events of the revolution, and fragmented by the early phases of political 
transition.  
4. Conclusion 
Has the former regime staged a comeback in Tunisia? It is true that not all the 
characteristics of the fallen regime disappeared with it. Collusion between 
politicians and certain economic agents has been reconfigured, but without 
disappearing, and corruption appears to have worsened since 2011. The securi-
ty forces still operate outside democratic control, even though, in a major dif-
ference with the former regime, they now claim to act autonomously of politi-
cal oversight. Nevertheless the triad at the heart of Ben Ali’s power (the 
presidential palace in Carthage, the security forces, and the business world) has 
been superseded by a fragmented structure composed of numerous influences, 
which do not necessarily converge towards stabilizing the situation in ways 
beneficial to the political authorities. And the government can no longer count 
on the support of the Tunisian General Labor Union (UGTT), the powerful 
central union that is now clearly asserting its independence.  
Yet I hope this article has shown that the argument that there is a massive 
and coordinated comeback by former government officials does not stand up to 
empirical scrutiny. Instead, analysis shows the individual and collective strate-
gies to adjust to a new political state of play, together with contributions by 
former officials to depicting the past in what is now a competitive narrative 
context. In a way, and without presupposing their lasting attachment to democ-
                                                             
13  This proposal triggered resistance and controversy, and it was a watered-down version of 
the law that was finally passed on September 13, 2017, granting amnesty only to high-
ranking civil servants. 
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racy, former government officials are exploiting a pluralist framework that 
thereby acts as the precondition for their return to political life. It is quite pos-
sible that they will end up rejecting this framework. But it is equally probable 
that they will flourish in it, and make a lasting return to politics. 
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